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ALOIS STUTZER, BRUNO S. FREY
University of Zurich 
World governance today is characterized by international organizations lacking democratic legitimacy 
and control by the citizens they claim to represent. These organizations are also often criticized for being 
inefficient. This has led to violent protests and to NGOs having great influence. To address these 
problems, we propose international governance based on the democratic idea of citizen participation: All 
citizens of the member countries of international organizations have the potential right to participate in 
the decision-making of international organizations via initiatives, referendums and recalls. In order to 
reduce transaction costs, a representative group of citizens is randomly selected who can actually exercise 
their participation rights.  
1. PROBLEMS WITH GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
Many institutions in the area of global governance are confronted time and 
again with public protests. In particular, the meetings of international 
organizations such as the IMF, the WTO and the World Bank, and of private 
organizations, such as the World Economic Forum, have been attacked 
frequently by large-scale and violent protests. These protests get substantial 
coverage by the media; often as much time and space is allocated to reporting 
on the demonstrations and demonstrators as to the issues under debate at the 
official meetings.  
The major charge brought against the institutions involved in international 
governance is that they favor “unjust” solutions to the world’s problems. The 
 We wish to thank Matthias Benz, Robert Cooter, Christoph Engel, Laurent Franckx, Henry 
Hansmann, Gérard Hertig, Simon Lüchinger, participants at the European Public Choice 
Meeting 2004, and an anonymous referee for their valuable comments.. 
protesters complain about these institutions’ neglect of the poor and are 
convinced that globalization raises, rather than diminishes, the number of 
people living in poverty.1 They also blame these institutions for neglecting 
environmental degradation. International organizations have, moreover, been 
accused of large-scale inefficiency and waste, and of being ineffective in the 
sense of not being able to put policies into action or enforce them. Still others 
complain about the “democratic deficit” of international organizations and 
deny the legitimacy of many representatives of the so-called global civil society 
involved in international governance. It is argued that, rather than reflecting 
“world opinion,” they represent the specific interests of the donors who fund 
NGO activities. 
Several reasons have been found to account for these failures: First, taxpayers 
of the nations funding the international organizations (the principals) do not 
effectively and sufficiently control the behavior of bureaucrats in international 
organizations (the agents). Second, international agreements involve the 
provision of public goods and thus provide incentives for free riding. This 
problem is aggravated because external enforcement of agreements is very 
limited between sovereign states. Third, the delegation of competencies to 
international organizations and their policy-making under current forms of 
democracy do not meet adequate procedural conditions to ensure that people 
in member countries feel like empowered citizens with autonomy and 
influence. Instead, current rules and regulations make international 
organizations susceptible to the influence of the governments of single 
member countries, business interests, and NGOs.2
Many solutions have been offered on how to improve global governance and 
to overcome the specific problems identified. One solution is to increase 
transparency so that the people concerned have a better knowledge of how the 
various policies proposed, and actually carried out, are going to affect them. 
Another solution is to tighten the rules, standards and criteria under which 
international institutions act. While these measures are useful, they are certainly 
1 Whether this is indeed true is another matter. For the view that globalization is good for the 
poor, see e.g. Dollar and Kraay (2004). 
2 Hewson and Sinclair (1999), Nye and Donahue (2001), Kahler and Lake (2003), Kaul et al. 
(2003) and the Commission on Global Governance (1995) provide an extensive list of references 
to the literature on globalization, transnational relations, international regimes and international 
organizations. On the global civil society, see e.g. Keane (2003) or Glasius et al. (2002). For 
recent contributions on global governance, see e.g. Held (1997), Walzer (1998), Barnett and 
Finnemore (1999), Pierre (2000), Keohane and Nye (2000), Keohane (2001), and Heritier (2002). 
The literature in economics is more restricted; see e.g. Vaubel and Willett (1991), Frey and Gygi 
(1990, 1991), Frey (1984, 1997d), Schulze and Ursprung (1999) and Rodrik (2000). 
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not sufficient to overcome the failures in international governance already 
alluded to. A far-reaching proposal would be to establish a World 
Government. As it would cover the entire globe, it would be considered 
capable of providing global public goods in an optimal way, and of reducing, or 
even preventing, global public bads. It would also be expected to overcome the 
inequality existing in today’s world.  
However, there are major arguments against a global government. In fact, it 
may not even be desirable. A global government must, by necessity, be a large 
bureaucratic organization, which would, if anything, be even more inefficient 
and wasteful than the existing international organizations. But even more 
importantly, individuals would be totally dependent on this new government. 
Persons who did not agree with its policies, or who felt oppressed due to a lack 
of freedom or too high and unjust taxes, would have no possibility of escape 
by migrating elsewhere. “Exit” would thus be impossible, which would rob 
dissenting people of the important possibility of making their dissatisfaction 
visible to the political decision-makers (Hirschman, 1970). The leaders of the 
global government would hold unprecedented power in their hands. As has 
often been remarked, and rightly so, absolute power corrupts absolutely, and 
there is no reason why this should not apply to a global government. However, 
it is highly unlikely that such a government will evolve in the foreseeable 
future, because the nation states dominating the present world, in particular the 
United States, cannot reasonably be expected to relinquish even small parts of 
their power in favor of a global government. 
We propose a different approach to international and world governance 
based on the fundamental democratic idea of citizen participation. While we are 
convinced that this proposal could fundamentally change world governance as 
it exists today, we would restrict it to improving the functioning of international 
organizations.3
Our proposal is based on two fundamental design elements: 
(1) All citizens of all member countries of a particular international 
organization should have potential participation rights in international 
political decision-making. 
(2) All citizens should have the same chance of being selected to actually 
have the possibility to vote. 
3 But our proposal could also be used beyond international organizations, in particular for new 
forms of public governance, such as the establishment of functional, overlapping and competing 
jurisdictions (so-called FOCJ). These are discussed briefly in section 5. 
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The first element refers to the advantages of democratic decision-making as a 
complement to the hierarchical decision-making process already in place in 
international organizations. Citizen participation is put forward as a political 
right enshrined in the “constitution” of an international organization. 
Participation rights would consist of three democratic instruments: (i) Citizens 
could propose changes to the ground rules (or constitution) of the 
organization. If enough citizens were to sign a popular initiative, the proposal 
would have to be put on the voting agenda, and would become a binding rule 
if approved in a ballot held in all member countries. (ii) Fundamental changes 
in the ground rules, or extensions of international agreements, would have to 
be approved in a mandatory referendum.4 (iii) Second priority would be given 
to a further extension of citizen participation that would include the recall of 
top bureaucrats in international organizations. In this proposal, citizens’ 
participation rights would not include elections. The appointment of top public 
officials in international organizations would stay as it is at present. This would 
allow public discourse to focus more on issues dealing with content rather than 
on candidates coming from the “right” nation. 
Citizens’ involvement would thus be understood as direct democratic 
participation. There is extensive knowledge in political science, law and 
economics about the working of direct democracy at the state and federal 
level.5 While there are international organizations of a size comparable to that 
of a U.S. state with regard to the population of their member countries, there 
are also numerous organizations representing many more people. Conducting 
referendums with a citizenry of a billion people is barely manageable and 
produces high transaction costs. 
We therefore propose a second design element that introduces a mechanism 
to reduce the number of people who will actually get the possibility of 
participating as voters. This can be achieved by using the principle of random 
selection among all the citizens of the member countries. The term “random” in 
everyday usage is associated with terms such as aimless, haphazard, uncertain, 
or indifferent. Here the word is used, as in statistics, where a random sample 
gives each and every member of the population the same probability of being 
selected. Random selection thus means that each citizen of a member country 
in an international organization has an equal chance of being chosen. He or she 
4 Alternatively, a referendum could only be held if required by a certain number of citizens or 
member countries. Mandatory referendums would, in certain cases, replace ratification by 
national parliaments. 
5 For reviews of the literature, see e.g. Bowler and Donovan (1998), Frey and Stutzer (2006), 
Gerber and Hug (2001), Kirchgässner et al. (1999), and Matsusaka (2004). 
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is, in this sense, a precise representative of the underlying aggregate citizenship. 
The basic democratic idea is that each person is capable of making a useful 
contribution to political decision-making, just as every citizen in a 
representative democracy has the power to vote, regardless of his or her 
income, education, gender, religion or race. 
As we envisage the main novelty in the second design element, we focus on 
the aspect of random selection. We expect four improvements as a result of 
our proposal:  
(1) International organizations would allow effective citizen participation in 
decision-making on issues of content; 
(2) Efficiency would be raised by effectively controlling the executive 
politicians and public officials in international organizations. 
(3) The influence of special interests in international governance would be 
weakened relative to latent groups and would be channeled within the 
rule of law. 
(4) Collective decisions would become more self-enforcing, due to the 
strengthened legitimacy of international agreements. 
The next section of this paper discusses the institutional design of random 
selection and direct political participation in international organizations. 
Section 3 lists the advantages and disadvantages of our proposal. The following 
section 4 shows that random selection is and has been not uncommon in 
political decision-making, and that there are other proposals taking advantage 
of the qualities of random selection. Section 5 compares the random selection 
of citizens to other proposals for improving global governance. Section 6 
offers concluding remarks.  
2. INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN: DIRECT POLITICAL 
PARTICIPATION OF RANDOMLY SELECTED 
VOTERS 
We propose to overcome the insufficient democratic foundation and efficiency 
of international organizations by empowering the citizens of member states to 
have a say in the decisions made. In order to deal with the frequently 
considerable number of citizens involved, the voting body is reduced to a size 
allowing voting to proceed in a manageable manner. This is achieved by 
selecting a restricted number of persons via a random mechanism, giving each 
Making International Organizations More Democratic / 309
DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1018
person the same chance of being chosen. The randomly selected citizens are 
given the right to vote on issues of content by means of popular initiatives and 
referendums, and by recalling the international organization leaders in cases 
where they disapprove of their performance.  
2.1. RANDOM SELECTION 
Using the random mechanism to select from among all citizens those who will 
have actual voting rights represents a constitutional choice6 behind the veil of 
ignorance between the many possible social decision-making procedures. The 
best-known procedures of this kind are the market, democracy, hierarchy and 
bargaining, but there are others, such as decisions made according to tradition 
(Dahl and Lindblom, 1953). The constitutional approach is procedural or 
process-oriented; it does not consider particular outcomes, but looks at the way 
decisions are reached. Decision-making mechanisms are chosen so that, in the 
long run, given people’s interests in the current political process, people’s 
preferences are best satisfied. Thereby, people have preferences about the 
process as such and experience procedural utility beyond the utility from the 
outcome reached (for a survey, see Frey et al., 2004). The procedural good of 
central importance for democracy is that ordinary people, rather than a self-
selected elite, make the ultimate decisions in international organizations. 
Empirical research indeed suggests that the possibility of participation provides 
procedural utility, independent of outcome utility.7
2.2. RANDOM SELECTION OF VOTERS 
Basis of Representation. A selection corresponding most closely to the standard 
understanding of democracy assigns equal weight to each citizen of the 
member states. In that case, the larger a country’s population, the greater its 
influence. However, an alternative possibility would be to assign the number of 
selected voters according to financial contributions (as in the case of the World 
Bank and the IMF), or to select an equal number from each country (similar to 
the one-country, one-vote rule in the UN General Assembly). Which 
assignment is chosen depends on a large number of factors. If, for instance, 
small member countries want to be protected from potential exploitation, the 
6 Constitutional choice is extensively discussed in Buchanan and Tullock (1962), Frey (1983), 
Brennan and Buchanan (1985), Mueller (1996), and Cooter (2000). 
7 The respective econometric analysis has been undertaken using self-reported subjective well-
being data in a cross-section over the 26 cantons of Switzerland, which grant their citizens 
unequal political participation possibilities (Frey and Stutzer, 2005). 
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same number of citizens should be selected from each country to decide on 
referendums. 
Random selection may in practice be undertaken by using any appropriate 
mechanical system (such as using lots) or by using computer programs. The 
underlying population from which the citizens are selected may be taken from 
the voter rolls of those countries which are members of the particular 
international organization, assuming that these countries are (at least in a 
formal sense) democracies. 
Voting mechanism.8 After the selected citizens have voted, a set of different 
decision rules is possible. Using simple majority is a natural starting point. 
However, the status quo, which represents at least a previous social consensus, 
might best be protected with the requirement of a qualified majority. In order 
to protect minority interests, it would also be possible to demand double 
majority, i.e. a majority of votes, as well as a majority of countries that approve 
a proposal. 
Conditions of selection. Most importantly, the term in office has to be decided. 
The shorter the term, the larger the number of preferences represented via 
random selection. However, this has the disadvantage that the selected citizens 
are less capable of informing themselves about the activities of the particular 
international organization. Thus, the more important experience and factual 
knowledge are in decision-making, the longer the term of office should be.  
A selected citizen may be associated with one particular international 
organization or with various international organizations. The more similar the 
activities of international organizations are, the more sense it makes to select 
voters who will serve for several organizations.  
Anonymity. The identity of the selected citizens can be made public or can be 
kept secret. Publicity enables other citizens to make their concerns felt to their 
selected fellow citizens, but also gives pressure groups the possibility of 
influencing them, putting non-organized groups at a disadvantage (Olson, 
1965). In many cases, the pressure exerted by the national governments is even 
more relevant. However, as the national administrations apply the random 
selection mechanism and have to decide whether to publicize which citizens 
have been selected, the identity of the representatives cannot be easily hidden 
from the national governments. In view of this, there is much to be said for 
8 We do not discuss different technically possible voting mechanisms, such as e-voting, here. 
The organization of the vote is left to the individual member countries. We do not suggest e-
voting in our proposal, because security issues with e-voting have not yet been dealt with 
sufficiently--it is probably far easier to manipulate e-voting than voting at the ballot box. 
Moreover, the transaction costs of voting are probably a minor determinant of the quality of 
decisions. 
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making the identity of the representatives known. Rules may be introduced 
limiting the undue influence of pressure groups. In particular, both active and 
passive corruption must be punished.  
2.3. CITIZENS’ PARTICIPATION RIGHTS 
The citizens selected by lot can exercise their rights in two different ways: 
(1) They can initiate votes on issues of content (initiatives) or on people 
(recall). Both a successfully launched initiative and a recall force the 
managers of the international organization concerned to hold a vote 
among all the citizens selected. Whether such votes are frequent or rare is 
to a large extent determined by the signature requirement. The signature 
requirement can be defined as a total minimum number across nations. 
However, it can also include minimum numbers of signatures within a 
percentage of countries, or restrictions as to the maximum duration of 
time between the point at which an initiative/recall is announced and the 
point at which the signatures are deposited.9
(2) They can vote in a mandatory referendum applicable to major issues, such as 
changes in the ground rules (the constitution) of the international 
organization.  
The content of initiatives is not restricted; however, proposals must be made 
for changes to the constitution of an international organization. Recall of the 
management of an international organization can be applied to politicians and 
public officials. Assigning a signature quorum faces a trade-off. The lower the 
quorum number, the larger the uncertainty among the managers, inducing 
them to take a short-term view. The higher the quorum, the stronger the 
position of the managers. The less discretionary room the managers have, the 
less threatening is such management power to the interests of the citizens of 
the member states. In some cases, the tasks of international organizations are 
so precisely defined that managers are severely restricted. If that happens, the 
quorum for recall may well be high. In other cases, the managers are, to a large 
extent, able to determine the organization’s activities by themselves, in which 
case a stricter restriction on the threat of recall is desirable. 
9 Alternatively, signing an initiative or a recall can be allowed to every citizen, whether selected 
or not. In this case, signature requirements should be substantially increased. 
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2.4. APPLICATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS 
The United Nations (UN) is in a crisis. Many of the alleged grievances are not 
new, including bureaucratic slowness, ineffectiveness and even corruption. 
More fundamental is the UN’s incapacity to reform itself and to change its 
ground rules in order to fulfill its mission to “save succeeding generations from 
the scourge of war.” A prime deadlock lies in the anachronistic Security 
Council. Of its 15 members, five permanent members (the four main victors in 
the Second World War – the United States, Russia, Great Britain and China – 
plus France) have veto power over all important UN decisions (including the 
composition of the Security Council itself). This distribution of power in the 
UN is not at all representative of the reality of international politics today, nor 
is it in any sense democratic. As a consequence, UN decisions–or more often 
non-decisions–lose legitimacy and the UN is far from being the moral 
authority it needs to be in order to successfully protect freedom and support 
democratic nation building. The deadlock is probably due not only to the 
privileged position of the permanent members, but also to the challenger’s 
policy that contributes to the deadlock, thus undermining the UN’s authority.10 
According to our proposal, citizens would have the right to initiate an 
amendment to the UN charter and thus set the agenda. This would allow the 
people to break the deadlock that is endangering a potentially great institution. 
Citizens interested in peace–rather than politicians involved in local rivalries 
with neighboring nations for seats in the Council–could collect signatures for a 
proposal. The proposal’s content is not restricted and could, for example, 
comprise a rotating Security Council, making decisions based on a qualified 
majority, and being accountable to the remaining UN member countries. The 
UN would then arrange a vote in which all selected citizens in the member 
countries could participate. If the initiative were to be approved in a majority 
of countries and by a majority of voters, the proposed amendment would 
become binding for the UN. 
3. EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSAL 
Selecting voters randomly from the population of citizens of the member 
countries belonging to an international organization has several important 
advantages over other ways of approaching the issue. We first discuss the 
10 On the one side, Germany, Brazil, India and Japan are supporting each other for a 
permanent seat in the Security Council while, on the other side, there are opponents to an 
enlargement because they do not want their neighboring country to have more power. The latter 
group includes Italy, Spain, Pakistan, South Korea, Argentina and Mexico. 
Making International Organizations More Democratic / 313
DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1018
advantages and disadvantages of random selection in general, and then evaluate 
our more specific proposal for its application to international organizations. 
3.1. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE RANDOM MECHANISM 
As is true for all social decision-making mechanisms, random selection has its 
strengths and weaknesses. Only the most important ones are mentioned here 
(for a fuller discussion see Carson and Martin (1999:34-38) and Elster 
(1989:103-122)). 
Major advantages are: 
 Random selection is fair in the sense that every person has an equal chance 
of being selected.11 If the random mechanism is correctly applied, no other 
consideration, such as income, status or political connections plays any role.  
 The selection is totally representative as, after a number of draws, the 
persons chosen exactly reflect the underlying population of voters. No 
particular gender, race, religion or any other group is favored. 
 Decisions by lot are easy to undertake and are universally applicable. A 
common method of deciding between two issues is to toss a coin. When 
there are more issues involved, balls are put into an urn, and then one or 
more of the balls is selected either mechanically or by a person (these 
procedures are well known from lotteries, and are regularly shown on TV). 
There are also important actual or presumed disadvantages: 
 The random method seems to lack “rationality,” in the sense that no reason 
for a particular choice is given. But individuals seem to have an innate need 
to attribute a reason to a certain choice. Having no reason for a selection 
leaves a feeling of dissatisfaction. The interpretation of random 
mechanisms as being aimless, haphazard and indifferent derives from this.  
 The persons chosen tend to have a reduced obligation to take the task they 
are chosen for seriously. Exactly because they are chosen indiscriminately, 
they can hardly pride themselves on having been selected because of their 
intelligence, dedication, efficiency or knowledge. As a result, the intrinsic 
motivation to perform well might be reduced (this is a kind of “crowding-
out effect,” see Frey (1997b)). 
11 This holds, of course, only for draws with equal probabilities, which are the rule. But it is 
easily possible to assign a person, or group of persons, more weight, e.g. they are given two times 
or three times as much weight. But the argument continues in the sense that no other 
considerations enter into the matter.  
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While this argument rings true, it is of lesser importance in reality than one 
might expect. Even purely randomly selected persons, after a short time, 
tend to attribute positive features to themselves, once they have been 
selected. At least to some extent, they believe that their choice has been 
“god’s will” (an aspect crucial in Athenian democracy, see Elster (1989:50-
52)) or, in a secularized society, that it at least has some unknown deeper 
meaning behind it. 
These advantages and disadvantages should not be considered in isolation. 
They need to be compared to the advantages and disadvantages any other 
social decision-making system has (following a comparative institutional 
analysis). This paper argues that the advantages of random selection are 
particularly strong for the selection of representative citizens to overview 
international organizations. While the disadvantages certainly cannot be 
dismissed, they are in this particular application reckoned to be of minor 
importance compared to the disadvantages of using other social decision-
making mechanisms (see section 5).  
3.2. STRENGTHS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS WITH RANDOMLY 
SELECTED VOTERS 
The most important argument in favor of the constitutional proposal is the 
strengthening of democratic control by the citizens. The democracy deficit now 
characterizing international organizations is overcome by giving citizens direct 
participation rights. As it would be complicated and time consuming to ask for 
everybody’s vote, a representative group of citizens is randomly selected. These 
selected citizens have considerable power through the use of initiatives, 
referendums and recalls. This enables them to not only react to what the 
management of the international organizations proposes, but also to exert 
agenda-setting power.12 
The democratization of international organizations gives them a measure of 
legitimacy which otherwise cannot be attained. The citizens of member 
countries, aware that they are fairly represented in international organizations’ 
decision-making processes, are motivated to provide international public 
goods, or at least to politically support their provision. An example would be 
international agencies for the improvement of global environmental goods 
(such as combating global warming), which today are essentially technocratic 
units without much, or any, democratic basis, acting at a far remove from the 
12 The crucial importance of agenda setting is discussed in McKelvey (1976) and Romer and 
Rosenthal (1978). 
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citizens. With a system of randomly selected voters connected to such 
organizations, the citizens of the various member countries could start to feel 
an incentive and obligation to participate in the joint effort. An important 
factor in creating this sense of participation would be the general discussion 
generated among citizens, whether they are selected or not.13 On the one hand, 
currently citizens are informed by NGOs mostly via the mass media (in 
particular TV and radio). On the other hand, with direct participation the 
citizens have an incentive to involve their representatives in discussions about 
the issues to be decided by the respective international organization. The public 
discourse from the grassroots level, as well as from specialists, serves to 
strengthen the willingness to participate in the provision of international public 
goods.14 
Another important advantage of direct participation rights for citizens is the 
resulting bundling of decentralized information from below about the possibilities 
and constraints of the international organizations’ activities. This information is 
less filtered and distorted than that coming from the organizations’ 
bureaucracy, which tends to be biased by strategic considerations. 
Recalls, as well as initiatives and referendums, are an effective means of 
controlling the management of the international organizations. This power can be 
exerted via the selected citizens and also by non-governmental organizations. 
They gain institutionalized access to making their demands heard. They are less 
induced, or even compelled, to go out on the streets and resort to violent 
action. Moreover, those non-state actors claiming to be the voice of the people 
have to convince the selected citizens as they gain relatively more influence.  
Finally, decisions on international agreements taken by the citizenry gain 
substantial legitimacy. It becomes costly for single governments of member 
countries to step back due to short-term interests, although no direct 
enforcement of the agreements is possible. Not sticking to these agreements 
cannot easily be justified by too high costs for the population, if a majority of 
selected citizens actually approved them. 
13 For the role of political discourse in multilateral organizations, see Verweij and Josling 
(2003). 
14 See experimental results with public goods games, demonstrating that pre-play 
communication, even solely identification of the persons involved, strongly raises the willingness 
to contribute to the provision of public goods. See Bohnet and Frey (1999) and the extensive 
survey by Sally (1995). A cross-section econometric analysis for Swiss cantons suggests that the 
more extensive the citizens’ direct participation rights are, the higher tax morale is, and therefore 
the lower tax evasion is (Pommerehne and Weck, 1996; Frey, 1997a). See also Torgler (2003). 
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3.3. POTENTIAL WEAKNESSES 
As has already been pointed out, all social decision-making systems have 
disadvantages. This also holds for the random selection of citizens who have 
extended democratic participation rights in international organizations. But, as 
will be argued, many of these shortcomings are not as serious as they initially 
appear to be.  
It may be argued that randomly selected citizens do not have the skills 
necessary to decide in a reasonable and effective way on the constitutional 
matters of international organizations. By definition, the selected citizens only 
have average education and may therefore be perceived to be ill prepared for 
the task. This argument goes to the roots of political decision-making. 
Democracy is based on the principle that the citizens, on average, are capable 
of making political decisions in a reasonable way. They have one great 
advantage over professional politicians and bureaucrats: they know their own 
preferences better and are therefore able to express them better politically. 
Moreover, there is the fundamental principal-agent problem in politics: the 
professional politicians should act in the interests of their principals, the citizens, 
but they only have limited incentives to do so. In a representative democracy, 
the professional politicians are responsive to the citizens’ preferences, 
especially at election time. Empirical evidence demonstrates that, at other 
times, the actions undertaken by the professional politicians deviate 
substantially from the citizen’s wishes.15 In the extreme, the politicians 
“exploit” the voters by pursuing policies according to their personal or party 
ideologies, follow the interests of well-organized and financially well-endowed 
pressure groups, or decide in their own favor (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980, 
1985). For instance, they accord themselves special privileges (e.g., immunity 
from laws) or material benefits (such as generous compensations and pensions, 
sumptuous expense accounts, cars and planes at their free disposal). With 
direct participation rights of the citizens, these problems arise to a much lesser 
extent. Econometric studies have been able to show that citizens can make 
well-reasoned political decisions. Indeed, the more extensive citizens’ direct 
participation rights are, the better the public economy is run. For instance, the 
relationship between public expenditures and revenue is better controlled, so 
that the public debt per capita is lower. It has also been shown that per capita 
income is higher because the public sector is better run, and that even self-
reported subjective well-being is higher.16 
15 See, e.g., the evidence on political business cycles in Frey (1997c) and Mueller (2003:part IV). 
16 See Kirchgässner et al. (1999) and Frey and Stutzer (2000), as well as the literature 
mentioned in footnote 5. 
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A related argument claims that randomly selected citizens are not well enough 
informed and are therefore at the mercy of bureaucrats. First of all, it must be 
said that the same applies even to professional politicians; public officials 
always have more information at their disposal, because they have often been 
in charge of particular issues for a much longer period of time. It should also 
be noted that randomly selected citizens tend to rise to the challenge and can 
collect the information necessary for making reasoned decisions. Such 
information need not be very detailed: what matters are the fundamental issues 
to be decided on. Citizens need to be able to draw on the knowledge of 
experts, whose job it is to provide detailed information. Moreover, empirical 
evidence shows that it would be a mistake to take the present level of 
information about the issues related to international organizations as a 
constant. Rather, the amount of information consumed is endogenously 
determined and is higher when citizens have more extensive political rights 
(Benz and Stutzer, 2004). It can thus be expected that the randomly chosen 
citizens are capable and willing to learn the information necessary to perform 
their task adequately. 
It may also be claimed that randomly chosen representatives have little 
incentive to participate in the decision making of the international organization 
to which they are assigned to. But a high participation rate should not be taken 
as a value in itself. What matters is that the selected citizens participate in the 
initiatives, referendums and recalls when important issues are at stake. Such 
behavior provides clear signals to the management of international 
organizations that they are effectively controlled by the citizens and cannot 
simply do what is in their own interests. Most people will consider it an honor 
to be selected as a citizen with actual voting rights to an international 
organization, and will therefore have an incentive to participate. 
Quite a different argument questions whether the people perceive the random 
selection of a group of citizens to be fair. In the private realm, there is indeed 
considerable resistance to random decisions. Several studies have analyzed the 
allocation of private goods in situations of shortage. In a survey among the 
population, the use of a random decision mechanism has been considered to 
be less fair than alternative social decision-making mechanisms such as “first-
come, first-served,” an allocation by the commune, or even the use of a price 
system (Frey and Pommerehne, 1993; also Wortman and Rabinowitz, 1979; 
Erez, 1985). Such resistance where rationing is concerned certainly has to be 
taken into account. However, in the public sphere, resistance can probably be 
overcome by showing the citizens the advantages of random selection, in 
particular the guarantee that every citizen is treated equally. People can also be 
informed that random systems are used, and generally accepted, in many areas 
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relating to their personal lives as, for instance, in the hugely popular national 
lotteries, where the mechanism used is extensively shown on primetime TV.  
Another argument relates to the situation in those member countries with 
little or no democratic tradition. While the random mechanism can probably be 
controlled from outside, this is less likely to be the case for the underlying list 
of the electorate, and the communication of who has been selected. But, most 
importantly, the selected citizens in such a country will be induced, or forced 
directly, to follow the will of the country’s government. This is unfortunate, 
but our proposal does not claim to be able to transform non-democratic 
governments into democratic governments. If indeed the representatives are 
forced to act as government pawns, the situation is no worse than today, where 
the delegates of international organizations are directly selected by the 
respective non-democratic governments. However, the random selection of 
citizens may even give them a measure of independence with respect to their 
own government, not least because they decide jointly with selected citizens in 
democratic countries. Such joint experiences may (under the most favorable 
conditions) even initiate a step towards democratization (Sen, 1999). 
A final argument might be the hint offered by the largely failed experiment of 
running a globally representative decision-making body by ICANN.17 The 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) was 
founded in California in 1998 as a not-for-profit corporation based on an 
initiative of the U.S. government. ICANN was charged with the technical 
coordination of the Internet, including standard-setting, the allocation of top-
level domains and technical administration, i.e. involving significant regulatory 
functions. ICANN was understood to be an open and representative body 
accountable to the Internet community; however, it soon instead showed 
strong features of regulatory capture.18 This finally led to demand for the 
election of five of its 19 directors. In the fall of 2000, ICANN held a global 
online election, open to all Internet users. In fact, voting was only possible for 
those users who registered in advance to get a pin number by regular mail, 
which then allowed them access to the e-voting portal on the Internet. This 
procedure was very expensive and resulted in a low participation rate 
(calculated as a fraction of all Internet users). After disputes developed between 
the newly elected and the old board members, the experiment was ended when, 
on December 15, 2002, the elected directors’ terms expired. This experience 
17 Illuminating analyses of the ICANN experiment with representative democracy are provided 
in Hunter (2003) and Palfrey (2004). 
18 For an economic analysis of ICANN’s monopolistic position in the international governance 
of the Internet, see Brady (2003). 
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highlights that democratization as understood in the case of ICANN is very 
different from the direct political participation of selected voters which we 
have described. Thus ICANN’s experience is not very useful to assess the 
practicality of our proposal. Our emphasis is on voting on issues rather than 
people. More importantly, in the ICANN case, democratic participation 
possibilities were specific and restricted to the election of a minority of 
directors in an otherwise complicated decision structure. From the very 
beginning, users’ empowerment was rather limited and was not motivating of 
participation. Finally, while there is an argument for citizen participation in 
technical coordination, it is not where we would start promoting our proposal. 
4. RANDOM SELECTION: EXPERIENCES IN THE PAST 
AND PROPOSALS IN THE LITERATURE 
4.1. PAST EXPERIENCES 
Current and past experiences show that the use of random selection is not 
outlandish.19 There are many examples where random procedures are used--for 
example, in games of chance, such as lotteries and roulette, in decisions among 
friends when other methods run into problems, in scientific research (e.g., for 
drug testing or to decide between competing empirical models) or in admission 
to university. But random mechanisms have also been used in the political 
realm. Firstly, they can be used as a strategy to make decisions. An important 
example is conscription for military service. In the 1970s, the U.S. government, 
for instance, used a lottery based on birthdays to determine which men were 
drafted into the army in order to fight in Vietnam. Draft lotteries were also 
used during World Wars I and II, both in the United States and in several 
European countries. Every eligible man should have an equal probability of 
being chosen.  
Secondly, random mechanisms can be used as a strategy to choose decision 
makers. The best-known example today is the choice of persons to form a jury 
in serious criminal cases, such as murder, but sometimes also in civil cases. 
Criminal juries are of major importance in Anglo-Saxon countries, but also 
exist on the European continent, especially in Scandinavia. While professional 
judges are certainly more knowledgeable, the major reason to randomly select 
jurors is in order that justice be perceived as fair. Persons drawn by chance 
19 There has been an extensive discussion on the use of the random mechanism in politics. See 
Elster (1989:chap.II) and Carson and Martin (1999). They also refer to much additional 
literature.  
320 / REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1:3, 2005
from the whole population are seen to be, on average, more honest than some 
professional judges, and to reflect more closely the moral standards of the 
population. Moreover, fairness may lie in being heard and judged by ordinary 
people drawn from the whole population.20 
The past has known important cases in which random selection has been 
used. Classical democracy in Athens in the fifth and fourth century B.C., which 
is still a model for today, used random selection as a central feature (Manin, 
1997; Hansen, 1991; Engelstad, 1989). The Assembly, which every one of the 
between 30,000 and 60,000 citizens could attend, took the most important 
decisions. Its business was prepared by the Council of 500 members, 
composed of 10 groups of 50 members each. Each group was chosen by lot 
from one of the ten tribes of Athens. Each group took a turn as the 
Committee (prytany), and the order in which this was done was determined by 
lot. The persons presiding over the Assembly, the Council and the Committee 
were chosen by lot on the day they met. In addition, most public officials were 
chosen randomly. The only exception was when competence was considered 
fundamental for a particular office, such as the military officers and financial 
officials who were elected. Moreover, not all citizens could become randomly 
selected officials. They had, for instance, to be at least thirty years old. They 
were also subject to an assessment when selected, as well as at the end of their 
respective terms of office.  
It is likely that other ancient Greek city-states used similar random 
mechanisms to select their politicians and public officials, but little is known 
about the respective rules. But random choice is well documented for medieval 
Italian city-states. It played a large role, particularly in Florence between 1328 
and 1530, where the six to 12 members of the city government (whose terms 
were quite short, sometimes being only of two months’ duration) were chosen 
by lot from the volunteers running for office. Their ability to do the job was 
scrutinized by a group of aristocrats and citizens. The latter were again selected 
by lot. Random mechanisms were also extensively used in other Italian city-
states, such as Bologna, Parma and Vicenza, as well as in Barcelona. It was 
used in Venice until the city’s independence was terminated by Napoleon in 
1797. The selection process for the doge was very complex and, at each stage, 
involved random elements (Knag, 1998). First, 30 members of the Great 
Council, composed of several hundred members, were selected randomly and 
then reduced to nine by another draw. These persons elected a new group of 
40, which in turn were reduced to 12 by yet another draw. These 12 persons in 
20 In reality, neither the draft nor juries are chosen in a perfectly random way (Carson and 
Martin, 1999:20-21, 26-30; Elster, 1989:93-103).  
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turn elected a new group of 25, which was again reduced by a random 
mechanism to nine. This was repeated several times. Only then did a group of 
41, none of whom could have been chosen previously, elect the doge. In the 
1900s in San Marino, a similar procedure was used to select the state’s two 
governors from the 60-member council (Carson and Martin, 1999:33). 
4.2. PROPOSALS USING RANDOM SELECTION 
In the scholarly literature, many suggestions have been made to use random 
mechanisms for social decision-making because of their attractive features. It is 
sufficient to refer to some examples that are directly relevant for the proposal 
advanced here. 
Random dictator. Out of the total electorate, one person is chosen by lot to act 
as a dictator for a specified period of time. This proposal seems to be rather 
awkward, but there are some good arguments in its favor (Elster, 1989:86-91). 
Random election is the only system which does not make it in peoples’ interest 
to misrepresent their preferences (in particular by appearing to be more honest 
and less egoistic than they in fact are). In contrast, all elections provide an 
incentive to the contenders to present a too-favorable image of themselves to 
the voters. Another advantage is that the institution of a random dictator 
selects an “ordinary,” representative member of the citizenry, and thus 
prevents professional politicians with their special interests from taking over. 
These advantages are also directly relevant for the random selection of citizens 
in charge of international organizations.  
The institution of a random dictator also has some obvious disadvantages. 
The persons chosen as temporal dictators have no opportunity to learn from 
experience. The public bureaucracy, with its long and extensive experience, 
tends to accumulate considerable power and, when taken to the extreme, can 
dominate the citizens selected. In contrast to selection by lot, regular elections 
and re-elections have the advantage of making the incumbents accountable to 
the voters. As was already taken into account in the classical Athenian 
democracy, random selection is inefficient in those areas of governance where 
the office holders have to exhibit special competence.  
Probability Voting. Random selection can be combined with voting on issues. 
In the simple case of there being two alternatives, a vote is taken and the 
winner is then determined by using a random mechanism, whereby alternatives 
are attributed probabilities according to the percentage of votes they received. 
If alternative A receives 70% of the votes (and seven red balls), and B 30% 
(and three blue balls), then alternative A is chosen if, for example, a random 
draw from a receptacle with the ten balls results in the selection of a red ball. If 
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a blue ball is randomly drawn, alternative B is the winner (Frey, 1969; 
Intriligator, 1973). 
Voting by Veto. In this decision-making system (Mueller, 1978), each person 
puts forward one alternative, and there is also the status quo alternative. In 
each round of voting, one voter can veto one of the alternatives. The sequence 
in which the voters can act in this way is determined by lot. Whichever 
alternative remains, i.e. is not vetoed by anyone, is the winner. 
Random Selection in a Representative Democracy. From the voting populace, a 
random sample is chosen to form a national legislature (Mueller et al., 1972). 
Selection is through stratified sampling in order to ensure the representation of 
people with certain characteristics, as well as to prevent the overrepresentation 
of minority preferences. There is no stratified geographic sampling, as one goal 
of the proposal is to overcome pork barrel activities. 
5. COMPARISON TO OTHER PROPOSALS 
We have already argued that a global government21 is undesirable, inefficient and 
utopian. It need not be further discussed here. 
A less extreme idea is to enlarge and improve on the existing United Nations. 
There have been many suggestions to reform the United Nations (see, e.g., 
Bertrand (1997) and for overviews Ghebali (1997) and Hüfner and Martens 
(2000)). The latest report on the United Nations and collective security comes 
from a panel set up by UN secretary-general Kofi Annan (2004); however, as 
outlined in section 2.4 on the reform of the Security Council, the proposals in 
general do not aim at a direct relationship to the citizens of the countries for 
whose interests the UN claims to work. Thus the voice of the citizens is 
completely missing as compared to the large number of professional 
politicians, diplomats, experts and public officials engaged.  
Another proposal for the improvement of international relations seeks to 
integrate non-state actors into the decision-making process, most importantly 
the international non governmental organizations (INGOs), the transnational 
corporations and business NGOs (BINGOs). Their number today is estimated 
to be no less than 25,000, while in the 1950s it was just 1,000 (Keohane and 
Nye, 2000; Arts, 2003). This system is based on bargaining among these 
organized groups. It has the following problems: 
21 See, e.g., the proposals by Archibugi et al. (2000), Falk and Strauss (2001), Höffe (1999) or 
Galtung (2000). 
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 Many important interests are not organized in any effective way and are not 
part of this bargaining system. They also lose out compared to the well-
organized international NGOs. 
 The INGOs are not democratically legitimized; there is no established 
relationship to the citizens.  
 The outcomes of bargaining are uncertain and tend to favor the monied 
interests. While the ‘logrolling’ that takes place tends to lead to Pareto-
superior outcomes for those in the winning coalition, those groups which 
are not a part of it tend to lose out. 
 Many INGOs are inefficient and wasteful. It has therefore been suggested 
that there is a great need to subject them to auditing (The Economist, Sept. 
20, 2003). 
Yet another proposal for improving global governance is to give more 
importance to experts. They can be organized in groups in order to increase 
the amount of media attention they get. This is the road pursued, for instance, 
by the Club of Rome, the World Economic Forum, or the Copenhagen 
Consensus. With the expansion of the Internet, there are increasingly informal 
international networks. Such initiatives are well suited to make the views of 
specialists and/or highly engaged persons heard, but they are not 
democratically legitimized. They thus do not meet a crucial element of our own 
proposal.  
Another new way of organizing global governance is the idea of Functional, 
Overlapping, Competing Jurisdictions (FOCJ).22 It supports the emergence of 
new governmental units according to the needs arising. The geographical size 
of a FOCUS is established according to its functional needs, and therefore 
differs greatly between areas. Some FOCJ will be very large and even cover the 
whole world (for instance, in the case of global warming or the regulation of 
outer space), but they may also be very small (for instance, in the case of local 
public goods, such as sanitation). FOCJ are not part of the nation-state; rather 
they tend to overlap each other. When they exist and grow in importance, the 
traditional nation-states will be reduced to those functions they are more 
efficiently providing than a newly emerging functional unit. FOCJ are 
conceived to be democratic. They can take recourse to random selection in 
22 See, more fully, Frey and Eichenberger (1999) and Eichenberger and Frey (2002), and critical 
discussion by Vanberg (2000) and Blatter and Ingram (2000). FOCJ seem to be able to solve the 
trilemma discussed by Rodrik (2000), as they are able to align governmental jurisdictions with 
markets (but it should be noted that Rodrik envisages a World Government). 
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order to ensure that the citizens can effectively make their demands known and 
control the management. FOCJ are thus consistent with the ideas proposed 
here.  
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
World governance today is characterized by international organizations short 
of democratic legitimacy. Professional politicians, diplomats, experts and public 
officials determine their behavior without much, or any, control by the citizens 
they claim to represent. As a consequence, international organizations have 
become the object of large-scale violent protests. At the same time, 
international organizations are criticized as being inefficient and wasteful.  
This paper proposes an approach to world governance based on the 
democratic idea of citizen participation: From the citizenry of the member 
countries of an international organization, a random selection of people would 
be chosen to have the actual right to participate in international organization 
decision-making via initiatives, referendums and recalls. While this proposal 
would fundamentally change world governance compared to today, it would be 
restricted to improving the working of international organizations. The 
objective is to aim for four major improvements: First, selected citizens’ access 
to initiatives, referendums, and recalls would give them effective means with 
which to control executive politicians and public officials in international 
organizations and thus reduce inefficiencies. Second, the introduction of direct 
democratic mechanisms for decision-making would give NGOs a 
constitutional instrument to pursue their goals. However, it would also force 
them to use procedures provided by law and would thus weaken them relative 
to latent groups (like taxpayers), which would be empowered. Third, 
international organizations would be connected to the people on behalf of 
whose interests they are expected to act. This would give citizens back some of 
the autonomy and self-determination they enjoy in democracy. Fourth, 
decisions in international organizations, which are approved by randomly 
selected citizens, would gain legitimacy and would be more likely to obtain 
acceptance (even if they are against the short term interests of national 
governments). This would be important due to the almost complete lack of 
direct enforcement mechanisms in the international realm. 
The proposal is certainly in a preliminary stage and many aspects need further 
consideration. But one thing can be predicted with certainty: The decision-
makers in international organizations and national governments will reject it. 
While the basic thrust of an increased democratic element is difficult to deny, 
the proposal will be labeled naïve and impossible to realize. But such a reaction 
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would correspond exactly to the interests of these decision-makers. They know 
that introducing randomly selected citizens would reduce their discretionary 
power and importance. It would therefore be in their interests to find as many 
arguments against the proposal as possible. Quite another strategy would be to 
simply ignore the proposal. In any case, the entrenched persons and groups 
will not support it. But this does not necessarily mean that it will never be put 
into practice, at least for some particular or newly founded international 
organizations. 
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